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O'Callahan v. Parker: THE Relford DECISION
AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN
MLITARY JUSTICE
MYRON L. BIRNBAUM* AND CHARLES W. FOWLER**

I.

INTRODUCTION

IN an article published one year ago,' the present authors examined the
holding in O'Callakanv. Parker' that courts-martial, at least in peacetime, have jurisdiction only over "service-connected" offenses, and reviewed the decisions of the United States Court of Military Appeals
which determined what offenses were and were not in fact service connected. It was observed that two critical questions remained unanswered:
Is O'Callakanretroactive as to cases which were final on the date of its
promulgation, s and to what extent will the Supreme Court follow the
decisions of the Court of Military Appeals as to the application of the
test of service connection?
It was noted that the Supreme Court had recently granted certiorari
in Relford v. CommandantIoffering hope that a decision on the question of retroactivity might be forthcoming. Since then, on February 24,
1971, that case has been decided.5 Although a holding on retroactivity
had been widely forecast and expected in military legal circles, the
Supreme Court declined to speak on that matter. It did, however, cast
some light on its view of the limits of service connection.
Though Relford did nothing to alleviate concern as to whether the
thousands of earlier convicted servicemen will be able to reopen their
cases in reliance on O'Callahan, some comments upon Relford appear
to be timely, together with a summary of the military decisions on
service connection which have been decided in the past year."
* Colonel, Judge Advocate General's Department, United States Air Force (Ret.); member
of the California Bar.
** Major, Judge Advocate General's Department, United States Air Force; member of the
Maryland Bar. The authors' opinions, as expressed in this article, are their own and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Judge Advocate General's Department of the Air Force.
1. Birnbaum & Fowler, Military Appellate Decisions Following O'Callahan v. Parker, 38
Fordham L. Rev. 673 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Birnbaum & Fowler].
2. 395 US. 258 (1969).
3. The decision in O'CalIahan v. Parker was rendered June 2, 1969.
4. 397 U.S. 934 (1970).
5. 91 S. Ct. 649 (1971).
6. The interested reader is directed to the present authors' earlier article for a discussion
of prior developments, which will not be generally mentioned here. See Birnbaum &Fowler.
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II. THE Relford DECISION
Isaiah Relford, in 1961, while a corporal on active duty in the United
States Army and stationed at Fort Dix, New Jersey, committed certain
acts which led to his court-martial. He was convicted for kidnapping
and raping two women. The first victim was the 14 year old sister of
another serviceman who was abducted at knife-point from the parking
lot at the post hospital. The second was the wife of an Air Force man
stationed at the adjacent McGuire Air Force Base. She was kidnapped
at a stop sign while en route from her home on the base to her job as a
waitress at the base exchange which was also located on the base. Both
rapes took place on the Fort Dix Military Reservation and all of the
events occurred on the military reservation composed of the contiguous
Army and Air Force installations. Relford was in civilian clothes on
both occasions.
Relford was convicted of two specifications of rape under Article 1201
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and two specifications of kidnapping under Article 134.8 His sentence, which as imposed by the
court-martial included the death penalty, was reduced in the course of
appellate review to dishonorable discharge, total forfeiture of pay and
allowances, and confinement at hard labor for 30 years. The Court of
Military Appeals denied a petition for review on September 24, 1963.
This terminated the appellate process and the proceedings became final
and conclusive in due course, as provided by Article 76.1
In 1967, while in the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Leavenworth, Kansas, Relford began litigation seeking a writ of habeas corpus.
Although his initial claim was not a challenge to jurisdiction, and the
district court and the court of appeals holdings denying the writ antedated the O'Callahan decision, in due time the Supreme Court
granted certiorari "limited to retroactivity and scope of O'Callahan v.
Parker . .

.,,"

The Government strongly urged that the question of retroactivity be
decided," but the decision when rendered dealt almost exclusively with
the question of whether Relford's acts were distinguishable from those
of O'Callahan, so as to permit military jurisdiction within the test of
service connection. It will be recalled that O'Callahan, while absent on
7. The Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 120 [hereinafter cited as U.C.M.J.]. The
U.C.M.J. is codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970).
8. U.C.M.J. art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964).
9. U.C.MJ. art. 76, 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1964).
10. Relford v. Commandant, 397 U.S. 934 (1970).
11. 91 S.Ct. at 657.
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leave in Hawaii (then a territory) committed the acts off-base which
led to his court-martial conviction for the crimes of attempted rape,
housebreaking, and assault with intent to commit rape.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in O'Callahan did not set forth
any distinct tests for determining what was service connection. Rather,
he stated a series of factors which led to the conclusion of the majority
that there was no service connection in the case.' It is of interest to
note that Mr. Justice Blackmun, speaking for the Court in Relford,
reiterated the tabulation of the circumstances cited by Mr. Justice
Douglas in O'Callahan, namely:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

The serviceman's proper absence from the base.
The crime's commission away from the base.
Its commission at a place not under military control.
Its commission within our territorial limits and not in an occupied zone of a
foreign country.
Its commission in peacetime and its being unrelated to authority stemming
from the war power.
The absence of any connection between the defendent's military duties and
the crime.
The victim's not being engaged in the performance of any duty relating to the
military.
The presence and availability of a civilian court in which the case can be
prosecuted.
The absence of any flouting of military authority.
The absence of any threat to a military post.
The absence of any violation of military property.

[To these, the opinion adds] still another factor implicit in the others:
13
12. The offenses being among those traditionally prosecuted in civilian courts.

Mr. Justice Blackmun then observed that the Court in O'Callahan
had chosen to take "an ad hoc approach" in deciding on court-martial
jurisdiction. Accordingly, after identifying the parallels between the
two cases, he listed the differences-the factors relied on in O'Callahan
which did not favor Corporal Relford. These factors were elements 1, 2,
3, 7, and 10. Relford was not absent from the base. The crimes were
on-base. The second victim was engaged in PX work, "aduty relating to
the military," and was returning to her post after a short, approved
break. In addition, the security of two women properly on the post was
threatened and their persons violated.
Other "significant aspects" were also mentioned by Mr. Justice
Blackmun, one of which may have future importance: both victims
12. 395 U.S. at 273-74.
13. 91 S. Ct at 655.
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were related to a serviceman-one being a sister, the other a wife of a
serviceman.
In the discussion which followed, the interest of the military in the
safety of personnel and property on military installations was analysed
at some length. Of particular interest was the reference to a quotation
from Colonel Winthrop, 1 4 the nineteenth century military justice authority, which was cited by both the majority'5 and the dissent" in
O'Callakan and which, as Mr. Justice Blackmun noted, "even goes so
far as to include [court-martial jurisdiction over] an offense against a
civilian committed 'near' a military post."'1 7 The Court also declined to
draw a line between a post's "strictly military areas and its nonmilitary
areas" and between a serviceman's on-duty and off-duty activities and
time on post.'
The discussion led to the Court's holding that:
[W]hen a serviceman is charged with an offense committed within or at the geographical boundary of a military post and violative of the security of a person or of
property there, that offense may be tried by a court-martial. Expressing it another
way: a serviceman's crime against the person of an individual upon the base or
against property on the base is "service-connected", within the meaning of that requirement as specified in O'Callahan,395 U.S., at 272.10

In a highly useful appraisal of the scope of its decision, the Court
then observed:
We recognize that any ad hoc approach leaves outer boundaries undetermined.
O'Callahan marks an area, perhaps not the limit, for the concern of the civil courts
and where the military may not enter. The case today marks an area, perhaps not
the limit, where the court-martial is appropriate and permissible. What lies between
is for decision at another time.20

Finally, the Court addressed itself to the question of the retroactivity
of O'Callahan but, while granting its important "direct and collateral"
dimensions, declined to resolve that question until a later decision in
which it may be "solely dispositive of the case."'"
It may be seen that the decision in Relford did not go as far as military legal practitioners had hoped in providing a compendium for the
application of O'Callahan.On the other hand, it is valuable in helping to
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
2o.
21.

W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 723-24 (2d ed. reprint. 1920).
395 U.S. at 274 n.19.
Id. at 278-79.
91 S.Ct. at 657.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sort out developments since O'Callahan and provides at least limited
support for the validity of the decisions of the Court of Military Appeals
in the area. Before discussing this, however, it would be helpful to discuss certain military cases decided during the past year.

III. RECENT MnirrApy CASES
Since the early part of 1970, and while Relford was before the Supreme
Court, the Court of Military Appeals addressed itself to the question of
service connection in some dozen additional cases. The decisions were
uniformly in line with those previously reported and, while they stated
no new concepts, they further refined the court's view of the permissible
limits of court-martial jurisdiction under O'Cailahan.
A. On-Base v. Off-Base Offenses
The Court of Military Appeals has firmly adhered to its earlier holdings that crimes committed on-base in the United States are all serviceconnected.2 2 However, the fact that a sequence of criminal activity begins on the base and continues in the civilian community has been held
not to extend jurisdiction to divisible off-base aspects.
Thus, in United States v. Wils 23 the accused stole the auto of another
serviceman from an on-base parking lot and drove it from the base and
eventually across state lines. In addition to the larceny and other unrelated offenses, he was charged with interstate transportation of stolen
property in violation of the United States Code,2 ' which was pleaded
as a violation of the portion of Article 134 - providing for court-martial
jurisdiction over "crimes and offenses not capital." The court found
that the larceny was properly triable by the military court as an offense
committed on base, citing United States v. Paxiao.2 However, the
court held that the larceny and the interstate transportation were not
all part of one offense, thus distinguishing United States v. Crapo.-'
The court observed that the title 18 offense requires only knowledge
22. United States v. Harvey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 539, 42 C.M.R. 141 (1970); United States
v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 42 C.M.R. 131 (1970); see Birnbaum & Fowler 679-80 &
nn.29-42.
23. 20 U.S.C.MA. 8, 42 C.M.R. 200 (1970).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964).
25. U.C.MJ. art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964).
26. 20 U.S.CM.A. at 10, 42 C.M.R. at , citing United States v. Paxiao, 18 US.C.M-A.
608, 40 C.M.R. 320 (1969).
27. 18 U.S.C.MA. 594, 40 C.M.R. 306 (1969). In this case, an assault on a taxi driver
committed on-base was followed by his being taken off-base and robbed. The court held that
the robbery was a continuation of the on-base offense and was triable by courts-martial.
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that the vehicle is stolen, not that the offender be the same, and that
it was not significant for this purpose that the accused had previously
stolen the same car on base. Hence, it treated the transportation offense
as an off-base offense without other military connection, and therefore
beyond the jurisdiction of courts-martial. It should also be noted that
the court found no significance in the fact that the car belonged to a
serviceman. Thus, it adopted the position that the owner-serviceman
was the victim in the larceny-which in itself would confer jurisdiction
over that offense-but not in the subsequent movement of the stolen
car across state lines.28
B. Status of Victim
Prior to Relford, the Court of Military Appeals had decided that the
status of the victim of any offense as a serviceman was alone sufficient
to constitute service connection, 29 but status as a retired serviceman or
a dependent of a serviceman would not be. 0 This distinction was preserved in United States v. Snyder,"' where the victims of a manslaughter
and assault were the wife and child of the accused serviceman. Here,
the offense occurred off-base. The court held that neither their status
as military dependents nor the fact that the child's death occurred
in a military hospital conferred court-martial jurisdiction.
C. Overseas Cases
Since the O'Callahan decision was rendered, the Court of Military
Appeals has decided that courts-martial have jurisdiction over the crimes
of servicemen committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States unless extraterritorial jurisdiction is vested in a federal
civilian court, or the trial is otherwise prohibited, as by treaty. 2 Three
additional cases" have since been decided dealing with a very interesting
distinction.
28.

The court found no significance for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction in the fact

that the title 18 offense was, for military purposes, charged under U.C2M.J. art. 134, 10
U.S.C. § 934 (1964).
29. See cases cited in Birnbaum & Fowler 680 nn.43 & 44.
30. Id. at 681 nn.45 & 46.
31. 20 U.S.C.MA. 102, 42 C.M.R. 294 (1970).
32. See cases cited in Birnbaum & Fowler 678 nn.26 & 27.
33. United States v. Davis, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 27, 42 C.M.R. 219 (1970); United States
v. Hargrave, 20 U.S.C.MA. 27, 42 C.M.R. 219 (1970); United States v. Ortiz, 20 U.S.C.M.A.
21, 42 C.M.R. 213 (1970).
It would be helpful to briefly outline the historical context in which these cases arose. The
United States gained control of Okinawa in the Ryukyu Islands by military conquest. Thereafter, in the peace treaty with Japan, the United States recognized Japanese "residual
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In every one of the three cases, the defense contended that the military
courts were without jurisdiction, since extraterritorial jurisdiction was
actually vested in a federal civilian court. Chief Judge Quinn, in United
States v. Ortiz,3 4 observed that the language in O'Callahan "tends to
indicate that the cognizability of an act in a civilian court established
by the United States in the administration of [occupied foreign] territory does not preclude military prosecution of the act, if it constitutes
a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,"" and that
O'Callahanreferred to crimes "'committed within our territorial limits
... not in the occupied zone of a foreign country.' "I' However, he did
not rely on this distinction alone, for his review of the original grants
of authority to the United States courts in Okinawa and the subsequent
changes showed that the federal civilian courts there had no jurisdiction
over service personnel unless the military commander decided not to
exercise military jurisdiction. His earlier comments, however, signal the
possibility that in a subsequent case unaffected by an executive order or
treaty, the court may find military jurisdiction over crimes constituting
a violation of the UCMJ committed on foreign territory, despite the
presence of a federal civilian court of competent jurisdiction.
D. Drug Offenses
The Court of Military Appeals has been unanimous in its holding that
the use and the possession of marijuana and other prohibited drugs are
offenses having special military significance sufficient to confer courtmartial jurisdiction wherever committedVa It has also held that the
transfer of these drugs to another serviceman without compliance with
sovereignty" over the island, with the administration remaining in the United States until
a trusteeship could be established under United Nations auspices. This arrangement was
discussed at length in United States v. Vierra, 14 US.CM.A. 48, 33 C.M.R. 260 (1963). The
President granted authority for a Ryukyuan government, including a judiciary. This judiciary
is composed of two court systems, one maintained by the Ryukyuan government and the
other maintained by the United States for the trial of "employees of the United States
Government who are United States nationals." Exec. Order No. 10,713, § 10(a) (2), 3 CF.R.
368, 369 (1961), as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,010, 3 C.F.R. 587 (1964).
34. 20 U.S.C.M.A. 21,42 C.M.R. 213 (1970).
35. Id. at 22, 42 C.M.R. at..
36. Id., quoting O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 273 (1969).
37. United States v. Adams, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 75, 41 C.M.R. 75 (1969), affd on reconsideration, 19 U.S.C.MI.
262, 41 C.M.R. 262 (1970); United States v. Rose, 19 US.C.M.A.
3, 41 C.M.R. 3 (1969); United States v. Castro, 18 US.C.MA. 598, 40 C.M.R. 310 (1969);
United States v. DeRonde, 18 U.S.C.MA. 575, 40 C.M.R. 287 (1969); United States
v. Beeker, 18 US.CMA. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969); United States v. Wysingle 39 CIM.R.
693 (1967), rev'd on reconsideration, 19 US.C.M.A. 81, 41 C.M.R. 81 (1969), rev'd on
reconsideration, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 263, 41 C.M.R. 263 (1970).
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the Marihuana Tax Stamp Act 8 is service connected. The court has
recently held that the transfer of these prohibited drugs to a civilian
off-base is not service connected, although possession of the prohibited
drug by the accused immediately before the transfer would be service
connected and cognizable by a court-martial. 0 This distinction, like that
made in Wills, reveals the nicety with which the court applies its analysis
of the boundaries of service connection.
In United States v. Beeker,4 ' the court held that possession and use
of drugs is service connected but, absent other connection, importation
and transportation are not. Recent per curiam decisions have confirmed
this distinction as to importation. 42 In United States v. Pieragowski,48
where smuggling was charged under Article 134, 44 the court held that
military jurisdiction did not attach even where the prohibited substance
was flown into the United States on a military-chartered aircraft which
landed at a military base. The court noted that the charter did not change
the aircraft into a military vehicle. Moreover, although the plane landed
at a military field, the court observed that this "was a convenience
which did not eliminate the civilian character of customs inspection,
as evidenced by the inspection of the accused's effects by regular civilian
customs inspectors. 4 It is interesting to note that the fact that the contraband was introduced into the United States through a military installation did not render the offense "on-base" for the purpose of conferring
military jurisdiction. This, of course, does not disturb the court's holding
that the unauthorized possession of contraband drugs by a serviceman is
service connected.

IV. SOME ANALYTICAL COMMENTS
The first and most obvious observation inspired by correlating
Relford with the growing body of military cases is that the Supreme
Court has not at all indicated a more restricted view of service connec38. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, §§ 4741-62, 68A Stat. 560, repealed, Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 1101(b) (3) (A),
1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5329 (Oct. 27, 1970).
39. United States v. Adams, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 262, 41 C.M.R. 262 (1970), aff'g 19 U.S.C.M.A.
75, 41 C.M.R. 75 (1969).
40. United States v. Morley, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 179, 43 C.M.R. 19 (1970).
41. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969).
42. United States v. Hughes, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 510, 42 C.M.R. 112 (1970); United States
v. Pieragowski, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 508, 42 C.M.R. 110 (1970); United States v. LeBlanc, 19
U.S.CM.A. 381, 41 C.M.R. 381 (1970).
43. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 508,42 CM.R. 110 (1970).
44. U.C.M.J. art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964).
45. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 509, 42 C.M.R. at -
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tion than that which the Court of Military Appeals has developed pursuant to O'Callahan.
The holding in Relford is fully consistent with the view of the latter
court that military jurisdiction attaches to offenses committed on-base
solely by virtue of the location. There is, perhaps, one small area yet
undefined in this regard. The Supreme Court in Relford held that jurisdiction applies to "an offense committed within or at the geographical
boundary of a military post and violative of the security of a person
or of property there . .. 2"' Does this leave room for exclusion of jurisdiction in a case where the offense is committed on-base but is not
directed against on-base persons or property? Such an instance would
be rare as most of the offenses without victims committed on military
installations are themselves military offenses, such as absence without
leave and violations of lawful regulations and orders. What can most
readily be hypothesized is an offense involving some means of communication, with a victim off-base, such as forgery or an indecent phone call
originating on-base to a telephone in the civilian community. An analysis
of the decisions of the Court of Military Appeals strongly suggests that
it would not exclude these from court-martial jurisdiction, in light of
the threat that they pose to base security and discipline. However, the
careful language of Mr. Justice Blackmun only permits the observation
that the Supreme Court in Relford has left their view on this an open
question.
Another bit of language in the above quotation raises another question.
It has been noted that the Court laid more stress in Relford than in
O'Callahan on Colonel Winthrop's recognition of military jurisdiction
over offenses against civilians "near" a military post. 47 In its holding,
the Court referred to offenses within or at the geographical boundaries
of a military post. The use of "at" in contradistinction to "within" the
boundary must be given some analysis. At the least, it would seem to
include an offense just outside the base gate or in the shadow of the
boundary fence. Many bases are circumscribed by public roads just
outside the boundary line; would these be included? An additional
question posed by this language is whether it forecasts the possibility
of some further extension along lines reflected in Colonel Winthrop's
treatise.
It must be noted that Supreme Court consideration of this further
extension would almost surely be conditional upon a previous affirmance
of a conviction by the Court of Military Appeals. This court has not yet
46. 91 S. Ct at 657 (emphasis added).
47. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
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discussed a crime that was not clearly either on or off a military installation. The nicety with which the Court of Military Appeals has
applied the distinctions as to whether an offense is service connected
has previously been noted, and this would seem to militate against this
court's blurring the sharp distinction in this instance. On the other hand,
Chief Judge Quinn's original strong views against any broad application
of O'Callahan, expressed in his dissent in United States v. Borys,"8 the
first of his court's decisions on service connection, suggests that he, at
least, would not be adverse to re-evaluating the court's decisions limiting
court-martial jurisdiction, to the extent that it may be clearly signaled
by language of the Supreme Court. Moreover, of the three judges of the
Court of Military Appeals, Judge Ferguson has taken by far the broadest
view of the O'Callahan limitation.49 His fifteen year term on the court
ends this year. The future decisions of the court which will apply the
guidance of the Supreme Court on service connection as incompletely
expressed in O'Callaanand Relford, may depend to a large measure on
its composition.
A third aspect of the Relord decision also merits consideration. The
Supreme Court placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the two
victims were related to military personnel on the reservation. However,
the Court of Military Appeals has never seen a service connection in
that factor. In United States v. Shockley,"0 the accused's stepson was
the victim of multiple instances of sodomy and, without even noting
that fact, Judge Ferguson's opinion reversed the conviction of the one
offense which was not committed on-base. In United States v. Henderson,5 Judge Ferguson held that off-base carnal knowledge of a serviceman's daughter was not service connected, while in United States v.
McGongal,52 he held that sexual offenses by a serviceman against the
daughter of another serviceman, also committed off-base, were not within
court-martial jurisdiction. The most recent in this line of cases is United
States v. Snyder,53 which has been previously discussed." It is worthy of
note that Chief Judge Quinn dissented in all four cases. Relford may indicate that the Supreme Court would reach the same conclusion as the
Chief Judge.
Relford thus leaves room for the Court of Military Appeals to adopt
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

18 U.S.CM.A. 547, 550, 40 C.M.R. 259, 262 (1969).
Birnbaum & Fowler 677.
18 U.S.C!.MA. 610, 40 C!M.R. 322 (1969).
18 U.S.CM.A. 601, 40 C.M.R. 313 (1969).
19 U.S.CM.A. 94,41 C!M.R. 94 (1969).
20 U.S.C.M.A. 102, 42 CM.R. 294 (1970).
See text accompanying note 31 supra.
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future extensions on service connection through inclusion of some areas
beyond strict base boundaries or based upon the relationship of the
victim to the serviceman. However, it is not suggested that such a
development will occur soon, if at all. It would require an appropriate
case, with facts which would lead the respective military trial judge,
staff judge advocate, and Court of Military Review" to find that there
was service connection, notwithstanding the previous decisions of the
Court of Military Appeals. Only then would the case go to the latter
court, so as to give them an opportunity to reconsider their pronouncements in this field. A decision at any of the earlier levels that there was
no jurisdiction, based on the existing case law, would terminate action
so that the case would never reach the final appellate step.
In other respects, Relford does not conflict with the factors which
the Court of Military Appeals has accepted as establishing service connection. In particular, its reference to the relationship of the victims
to servicemen strongly indicates that the Supreme Court will accept the
view of the service court that an offense against another serviceman is
per se service connected.
A careful reading of Relford gives no real hint of what the Supreme
Court will rule on the question of retroactivity. The importance of the
question can scarcely be overstated. How many thousands of persons
are alive who were convicted by courts-martial before, during, and after
World War II for an offense which would not be held service connected
under O'Callahan can only be conjectured. In many cases, the factors
on which service connection might be based were never explored at the
trial, so that the Government will be without access to the once-available
evidence to counter an attack on this basis.
There is a surface attraction to the argument that if, as a constitutional
matter, courts-martial have now been held not to have jurisdiction over
a wide variety of off-base felonies, no person was ever validly convicted under those circumstances and all are entitled to redress. However, it must be recognized that many, and perhaps most, of those men
were fairly convicted of crimes which they did commit. Selection of a
military court for the trial did not reflect want of capability to convict
by a civil court, but a decision as to who should take the case reached
mutually by two levels of government on the basis of facts in the individual case. Indeed, in many cases the accused may have benefited by
selection of the military forum-in others, perhaps not. In any case, the
55. This court is the successor to the boards of review. The Army, Air Force, Navy

(which includes the Marine Corps), and Coast Guard each have one Court of Military
Review. See U.C2.J. art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (Supp. V, 1970).
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vast majority would now be beyond the reach of the civilian court which
might originally have tried them. The authors do not even pause to
consider the vast caseload which the courts might have to consider for a
belated application of the O'Callahandoctrine and assessment of monetary and other compensatory relief.

V.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

There is no reason to expect any early change in the effective application of O'Callakan to current cases. For the time being at least, the
Court of Military Appeals' decisions concerning what offenses are or
are not service connected will doubtless mark the limits of military
jurisdiction. No cases are now in the civilian federal court system which
promise any immediate reference to the Supreme Court on that aspect
of the question, while the Court's language in Relford certainly does
not betray any impatience with the military cases which have followed
its earlier pronouncement in O'Callahan.
On the other hand, there is reason to expect further definitive action
on the question of retroactivity in the near future. A case is now before
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which sufficiently isolates that issue to provide the instance in which it will be
"solely" dispositive as to which the Supreme Court spoke in Relford.
On December 2, 1966, James Ray Gosa, then a member of the Air
Force, was convicted by a general court-martial of the offense of rape
committed in Cheyenne, Wyoming while he was off-base on a pass and
dressed in civilian clothes. His sentence included a bad conduct discharge, total forfeitures, and confinement at hard labor for ten years.
The case was affirmed in due course by the Board of Review 0 and
appeal was denied by the Court of Military Appeals on August 16,
1967. 5 An application for a writ of habeas corpus having been denied
on August 19, 1969 by the United States District Court for the District
of Kansas, he filed an application for another writ based entirely on
his claim that his court-martial was void for want of jurisdiction, citing
58 The writ was denied
O'Callahan.
by the District Court for the Northern
56. United States v. Gosa, A.C.M. No. 19,784 (decided May 22, 1967).
57. United States v. Gosa, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 648 (1967).
58. The title of this action is Gosa v. Mayden. Overlapping his district court action,
Gosa also petitioned the Court of Military Appeals for reconsideration of their earlier denial
of appeal, basing his claim solely on O'Callahan v. Parker. That court denied his petition,
holding that O'Callahan does not apply to cases which became final before Its promulgation.
Gosa v. United States, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 327, 41 C.M.R. 327 (1970). Judge Ferguson dissented
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District of Florida on November 13, 1969,"' and in due course he took
his appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. c0
The appeal was at once set for hearing, but was subsequently postponed pending the Supreme Court's decision in Relford, in expectation
of a ruling on retroactivity. In light of the absence from Relford of any
guidance on that subject, a resetting of the hearing is being awaited and
should be known shortly.6 '
The facts of Gosa are so closely parallel to those in O'Callahan that
there is no reasonable likelihood of any consideration intruding into the
decision other than the simple question of retroactivity. Whatever the
decision of the Fifth Circuit, there appears to be a high probability that
the losing side will seek certiorari from the Supreme Court. Whether the
writ is granted and a formal opinion is forthcoming or the writ is denied,
the result should be the first indication of the Court's view on whether
O'Callalzan shall be applied retroactively.
VI.

CONCLUSION

At this time, the law determing what cases courts-martial may try
under O'Callahan appears to be fairly stable. The group of inclusive
factors determined by the Court of Military Appeals and listed in our
previous article6 2 has not been substantially altered and there is no basis
for expecting an early decision by the Supreme Court which may affect
it. While there is the possibility for some extensions noted above, they
cannot really be expected at this juncture. Staff judge advocates are
operating under these rules in advising commanders as to what cases
they can order to trial, as are military judges and the Courts of Military
Review in their judicial actions. The prospect of a case presenting the
real opportunity for a decision by the Court of Military Appeals which
might relax the strictures on military jurisdiction is slight.'a
The question of the retroactivity of O'Callahan appears to be headed
for determination with no more delay than the time inherent in the two
appellate stages yet remaining in Gosa. A holding against retroactivity
will present no problems to the courts and to the executive branch of
59. Gosa v. Mayden, 305 F. Supp. 1186 (NJD. Fla. 1969).
60. Appeal docketed, No. 29,139, 5th Cir., 61. In March, 1971, as this article neared completion, the hearing date was expected
momentarily. Argument may have been heard before publication of this article. The authors
express their appreciation to Major Earl Hodgson, Military Justice Division, USAF Judiciary,
for information regarding Gosa v. Mayden.
62. Birnbaum & Fowler 686.
63. While the judges would have an opportunity to encourage such a cree through dictum
or extra-judicial comment, such action on their part is unlikely.
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the Government, including the military services. On the other hand, a
decision which permits the reexamination of the question of service
connection in all pre-1969 convictions by courts-martial for offenses
not strictly military in character will require a hard look at the procedure to be used in processing the resulting demand for redress because of the case load potential. An appraisal of this must await the
promised decision of the Supreme Court.

